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According to Higgins's (1987) self-discrepancy theory, an individual's self-
esteem is based upon fulfilling one's self-expectations or the expectations of significant 
others (e.g., spouse or parent). Failure to live up to these expectations results in greater 
levels of depression, anxiety, and lower self-esteem. 
Previous research has also found that those low in Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) 
self-monitoring construct are more influenced by their own expectations, while those 
high in self-monitoring are more influenced by others' expectations. It was predicted that 
Christians who are low in self-monitoring will have greater levels of depression and 
anxiety and lower self-esteem if they fail to fulfill their own religious expectations, 
whereas Christians who are high in self-monitoring would have greater levels of 
depression and anxiety and lower self-esteem if they fail to meet the religious 
expectations of significant others. 
As predicted, for low self-monitors actuakideal religious self-discrepancies led to 
increased negative affect, but actuakother discrepancies did not. For high self-monitors, 
however, neither actuakideal nor actuakother self-discrepancies led to increased negative 
affect. 
VI 
The Effects of Self-Monitoring and Religious 
Self-Discrepancies on Negative Affect 
Much of the research examining interactions between religious motivation and 
low-self esteem or depression has yielded inconclusive results. Therefore, further 
research is necessary to examine why some very religious individuals are happy, healthy, 
content, and well-adjusted while other equally religious individuals are depressed and 
despairing. For this study, Higgins's (1987) self-discrepancy theory and Snyder and 
Gangestad's (1986) construct of self-monitoring were used to predict anxiety and 
depression among Christians. According to self-discrepancy theory, individuals' self-
esteem is based on fulfilling either one's self-expectations or the expectations of 
significant others (e.g., parents or spouse). When one fails to fulfill the expectations that 
are more important, greater anxiety, depression, and low self-esteem result. Previous 
research has also shown that self-expectations are more important for those who are low 
in self-monitoring, while others' expectations are attended to more by those high in self-
monitoring. From these joint considerations, it was predicted that Christians who are low 
in self-monitoring would experience greater depression and anxiety if they see 
themselves as failing to fulfill their religious self- expectations, whereas Christians who 
are high in self-monitoring would have greater anxiety and depression if they think they 
are not fulfilling the religious expectations significant others hold for them. 
Self-Discrepancy Theory 
Higgins's (1987) self-discrepancy theory describes the differences between the 
characteristics a person has, desires, and feels should be possessed. Two main dimensions 
comprise self-discrepancy theory: the domains of the self and the standpoints of the self. 
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The domains of the self are divided into three categories. The "actual self" refers 
to these attributes, characteristics, beliefs, etc. that an individual believes are actually 
possessed. The "ideal self ' are the attributes, characteristics, beliefs, etc. that an 
individual wishes to ideally possess. The third category, the "ought self," consists of 
attributes, characteristics, beliefs, etc. that an individual believes should be possessed 
(Higgins, 1987). 
The second dimension of self-discrepancy theory, the standpoints on the self, 
consists of the own standpoint and the other standpoint. The own standpoint is one's own 
personal perception of oneself. The other standpoint is one's perception of how important 
other persons, such as a parent or spouse, see that individual (Higgins, 1987). 
By organizing his theory into these two dimensions, Higgins (1987) derived six 
possible ways that a person can see oneself: the actual/own, ideal/own, ought/own, 
actual/other, ideal/other, and ought/other perspectives. Any one person can have or be 
influenced by one or more of these six points of view. To simplify these six viewpoints 
on the self, Higgins describes the actual/own and actual/other, as a person's "self-
concept,"' either what one sees in one's self (actual/own) or what someone thinks other 
people see in him or her (actual/other). The remaining four viewpoints are called "self-
guides." These self-guides are used to direct a person's life. An individual will not 
necessarily use all four self-guides. Some will be more influenced by the ideal selves and 
others by the ought selves, some more by the own perspective and others by the other 
perspective. In the end, self-discrepancy theory essentially states that people are 
motivated by their self-guides to reach a state of congruency between their individual 
self-concepts and their individual self-guides. 
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A self-discrepancy occurs when there is a difference between a person's self-
concept (actual self, own or other) and self-guide (ought or ideal, own or other). Higgins 
(1987) states that these self-discrepancies create emotional disturbance and that the larger 
the self-discrepancy, the greater the emotional upset. He differentiates between the 
specific type of disturbance held by each type of self-guide (ideal or ought) by 
hypothesizing that self-discrepancies from ideal self-guides create dejection or 
depression-related disturbances, while self-discrepancies from ought self-guides lead to 
anxiety or agitation. His reasoning is that ideal self-guided people may feel as though 
they have not or will not achieve a certain standard. Therefore, they may feel depressed 
as a result of having disappointed themselves or important others and having missed 
positive outcomes that would have resulted from achieving that standard. When ought 
self-guided people, on the other hand, feel as though they have not achieved a certain 
standard, they may feel anxiety due to anticipated punishment or other impending 
negative outcomes as a result of not having achieved that standard. 
Higgins (1987) states that these emotional disturbances may not occur as long as 
the individual with a large self-discrepancy is unaware of that discrepancy. It is the 
awareness that one has not achieved what one has wished for or felt obligated to achieve 
that creates the emotional discomfort. "The greater the magnitude and accessibility of a 
particular type of self-discrepancy possessed by an individual, the more the individual 
will suffer the kind of discomfort associated with that type of self-discrepancy" (Higgins, 
1987, p. 324). 
Self-discrepancies most often have been assessed by one of two measures. The 
Selves Questionnaire developed by Higgins, Bond, Klein, and Strauman (1986) is most 
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widely used. The Selves Questionnaire asks participants to list attributes for the actual, 
ideal, and ought selves. Test administrators then compare the attributes from the actual-
self list to the attributes in the ideal-self and ought-self lists using a thesaurus to examine 
how well attributes match each other and assign a score to each attribute based upon the 
quality of that match. Discrepancy scores are then assigned by taking the difference 
between the total score on the actual-self list and the ideal-self or ought-self lists. The 
higher the discrepancy score, the greater the difference between the individual's self-
concept and self-guide. Hoge and McCarthy (1983) developed a second measure on 
which participants answer an eight-item scale with Likert-type responses assessing 
various actual-self and ideal-self attributes. Respondents indicate how true of themselves 
each of the items is by giving a score of 1 (not at all true) to 6 (very true). One open-
ended item is included at the end of the scale for respondents to indicate further important 
attributes not addressed in the first eight items. Discrepancy scores are assigned by taking 
the difference of real-self and ideal-self ratings for each item and then calculating an 
average total discrepancy across all nine items. 
Higgins and his colleagues have done a number of studies testing his hypotheses 
of self-discrepancies and the corresponding emotional disturbances. The results of the 
studies (Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1985; Higgins, Klein, & Strauman, 1987; Higgins, 
et ah, 1986; Strauman & Higgins, 1987) are summarized by Higgins's (1987) and lend 
considerable support for his theory of self-discrepancy. 
Strauman and Higgins (1988) again examined self-discrepancies in two studies. 
They found, in support of the theory, that actual/own versus ideal/own discrepancies were 
uniquely related to dejection, frustration, and anger towards self and that actual/own 
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versus ought/other discrepancies were uniquely related to agitation and anger at others, as 
well as resentment (Study 1). They also found that social anxiety was related to 
actual/own versus ought/other discrepancies and that depressive symptoms were related 
to actual/own versus ideal/own discrepancies best fit the results obtained (Study 2). 
Moretti and Higgins (1990) examined the ability of self-discrepancies to predict 
self-esteem. Participants filled out the Selves Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 1986) and 
Hoge and McCarthy's (1983) measure of self-discrepancy. Self-discrepancy scores were 
obtained on both measures and correlated with participants' scores on two measures of 
self-esteem. 
Significant correlations between actuakideal discrepancies on the Selves 
Questionnaire and both measures of self-esteem were observed, but similar significant 
relationships were not found for the Hoge and McCarthy scale and self-esteem. These 
findings imply that the Selves Questionnaire is a superior instrument for predicting self-
esteem levels resulting from self-discrepancies. The better predictability of the Selves 
Questionnaire appears to be because its discrepancies are related to attributes named by 
the individual instead of from attributes named by another person. While there was no 
significant correlation found between actual-ought discrepancies and self-esteem, these 
results indicate that discrepancies derived from Higgins's (1987) measure of self-
discrepancy are better predictors of self-esteem level than Hoge and McCarthy's (1983). 
Self Monitoring 
Whereas self-discrepancies examine the differences between what an individual is 
and wants to be (whether the ought or ideal self), self-monitoring examines differences in 
how people portray themselves to others. Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) self-
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monitoring construct was developed at much the same time as Higgins's self-discrepancy 
theory. Snyder and Gangestad, like Higgins, maintain that each person has a type of inner 
self that is comprised of what a person actually believes and feels, like Higgins's actual 
self. In addition to that inner self, most people also have multiple selves that they 
demonstrate in social settings, the way an actor moves from one role to another, 
depending on the script. The extent to which each person controls, or monitors, the self 
that is seen by the public is called self-monitoring (Snyder, 1987). 
High self-monitors are typically very concerned about the images or selves they 
allow others to see. They tend to tailor the way they act, or the self they demonstrate, to 
their social situation. They most often act in a way to conform to the expectations of 
others around them. According to Snyder (1987), most people monitor their projected self 
to some degree, but for high self-monitors especially, doing so becomes a core way of 
living. On the other hand, low self-monitors are more concerned that the self they 
demonstrate in public is congruent with their true inner self. They are much less apt to 
conform to the expectations of a social situation, especially if those expectations are 
contrary to their own beliefs. 
Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) Self-Monitoring Scale consists of 18 items, such 
as, "I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others." They are presented as 
statements about how an individual's life is led, and individuals respond whether each 
statement is true or false about their lives. The items are designed to assess different 
situationally appropriate methods of presenting the self, such as assessing how much 
attention is paid to monitoring social cues, controlling expressive behaviors, and shifting 
from one self to another when changing social situations. 
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Combining Self-Monitoring and Self-Discrepancy Theory 
Gonnerman, Parker, Lavine, and Huff (2000) examined the extent to which self 
monitoring and standpoints on the self moderate the affective states of individuals in 
terms of discrepancies between actuakideal and actuakought selves. The researchers' 
hypotheses were that, for low self-monitors, only self-discrepancies from the own 
standpoint would be significantly related to depression and anxiety. For high self-
monitors, only self-discrepancies from the other standpoint would be significantly related 
to depression and anxiety. The expectations were based upon the idea that if high self-
monitors are most concerned about how they portray themselves to others, they would be 
most concerned about discrepancies from the other standpoint, while if low self-monitors 
are most concerned about reflecting their own ideals, they would be most concerned with 
discrepancies from their own standpoint. 
Participants were divided into either high or low self-monitoring categories, 
depending on whether their score on Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) Self Monitoring 
Scale fell above or below the sample's median split. In addition to filling out the self-
monitoring instrument, participants also filled out Higgins's Selves Questionnaire, and 
two self-discrepancy scores (own and other perspectives) were calculated for each 
individual. After self-discrepancy scores were determined, the participants filled out a 
number of measures assessing anxiety and depression. 
Gonnerman et ah (2000) evaluated the relationship between self-discrepancy and 
depression for the low and high self-monitors from both the own and other standpoints. 
The results confirmed the hypotheses. Specifically, low self-monitors had a significant 
relationship between discrepancies and depression only in the own standpoint, indicating 
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that low self-monitors are concerned with not living up to their own ought and ideal 
expectations. Results further indicated that high self-monitors had a stronger relationship 
between self-discrepancy and depression and anxiety from the other standpoint than from 
the own standpoint, indicating that high self-monitors are more concerned with not living 
up to others' expectations. 
Given the established relationships for self-monitoring and self-discrepancies with 
depression and anxiety, it was expected that similar self-discrepancies in an individual's 
religious beliefs and motivations would similarly be related to depression and anxiety. 
Religious Beliefs 
Batson, Schoenrad, and Ventis's (1993) Doctrinal Orthodoxy was designed to 
measure one's belief in core Christian doctrines. The scale consists of 12 statements such 
as "I believe Jesus Christ is the Divine Son of God," to which the individual responds in a 
Likert-type format from "strongly disagree" (1) to "strongly agree" (5). A measure of 
orthodoxy will be used in the current study. 
Religious Motivation 
Gordon Allport (1950) introduced the terms immature and mature religion to 
describe the way that religious individuals incorporate religion into their lives. Allport 
contended that as people grow from childhood to adulthood, they generally move from 
immaturity to maturity in most areas (intellectual, emotional, physical). However, not 
everyone grows in all areas. Intellectual and emotional growth do not necessarily 
accompany physical growth, and this is especially the case with religion. For people who 
are religious for most of their lives, the immature religion of childhood is generally one 
that is comforting and familiar, providing a basis of stability for life. As people age, they 
9 
often find the religion of childhood to be sufficient for their purposes. It is difficult and 
uncomfortable to challenge long held beliefs, especially when those beliefs provide the 
holder with positive rewards such as security or consolation. Therefore, growth of 
religious sentiment, as Allport calls it, may be stifled and remain immature. 
Mature religion on the other hand is one that " . . . comes a b o u t . . . by the desire 
that this sentiment shall not suffer arrested development. . . ." (Allport, 1950, p. 59). 
Mature religion is cultivated to reflect the positive experiences of the person holding 
those beliefs. It is not merely self-gratifying. Rather, a mature religion is one that allows 
the holder to expand interests to concepts beyond the self. It allows viewing of oneself 
objectively, in perspective to the rest of the world and seeing oneself as others do. It also 
unifies all experiences of the person into a whole; that is, it affects every aspect of the 
individual's life. Mature religion is not put into use only when it serves a purpose to the 
individual. Instead of merely meeting needs or fulfilling desires, it provides a framework 
by which one's life is led. It welcomes challenges and existential questions, and it allows 
growth of a nature that immature religion is unable to allow. 
Allport and Ross (1967) further developed the study of religious motivation by 
expanding from immature and mature religion to extrinsic and intrinsic religion. The 
authors began their definitions of these two terms by saying, " . . . the extrinsically 
motivated person uses his [sic] religion, whereas the intrinsically motivated person lives 
his [sic] religion" (p. 434; italics added). The extrinsic motivation for religion is 
essentially immature. The person with extrinsically motivated religious beliefs holds 
those beliefs because they provide something or because they meet certain needs, such as 
security, self-assurance, or social connectedness. On the other hand, the person with 
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intrinsically motivated religious beliefs embraces or internalizes those beliefs. All other 
needs, as important as they may be, are considered less important than the religious 
belief. Intrinsic motivation for religion is mature. 
Allport and Ross's original scales for assessing these motivations were called 
Extrinsic and Intrinsic Scales of Religious Orientation. They consisted of 11 statements 
assessing extrinsic motivation (e.g., "What religion offers me most is comfort when 
sorrows and misfortune strike.") and 9 statements reflecting intrinsic motivation (e.g., 
"My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life."). Persons 
responded to each item in a Likert-type manner indicating "I definitely disagree" to '"I 
definitely agree" (Allport & Ross, 1967, p. 436). Batson et ah (1993) slightly modified 
the wording on a few of the original items in order to move the Likert-type response 
choices from a 5-point scale to 9-point scale. 
Gorsuch and Venable (1983) developed an age-universal scale to measure 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. They posited that the original scales were developed 
for adults, and therefore were not accurate measures for the motivations of children and 
adolescents. Their modified scale was found to be equally reliable and valid with children 
and adolescents compared to the original scales, with wording that makes it easier for 
children down to the fifth grade level to comprehend the statements on the scales. 
An EBSCO search revealed that since their introduction, more than 375 published 
studies have used Allport and Ross's scales, Gorsuch and Venable's scale, or other 
derivations to assess how intrinsic and extrinsic motivations affect other behaviors or 
attitudes. Some examples are antihomosexual sentiment among Christians (Fulton, 
Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999), religious motivation in middle-age (Kivett, 1979), religion 
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and rationality (Watson, Milliron, Morris, and Hood, 1994), spiritual and psychological 
well-being (Genia, 1996), and depressive symptoms (Maltby & Day, 2000). 
Batson and Ventis's (1982) introduction of quest motivation created a third major 
dimension in the study of religious motivation. Quest motivation, like intrinsic 
motivation, is mature. It also has moved from the self-gratifying nature of immature or 
extrinsic religion to a nature that grows and develops along with the individual. Batson 
defined quest motivation as ".. .an open-ended, responsive dialogue..." (Batson et ak, 
1993, p. 169) about religion. It is essentially an open-minded attitude toward change and 
searching for the answers to the existential questions that are part of the nature of 
religion. Batson & Ventis first introduced a six-item measure in 1982. McFarland (1989) 
developed a 10-item revision of the quest scale, and Batson et ak (1993) produced a 12-
item revised scale to measure quest motivation. Many researchers have since 
incorporated the quest dimension into their study of religious motivation, including 
studies of authoritarianism and religious fundamentalism with quest (Altemeyer & 
Hunsberger, 1992), and relationships of religious attitudes to religious orientations 
(Kristensen, Pedersen, & Williams, 2001). 
Religion and Self-Esteem 
Most research regarding religion and self-esteem has yielded mixed results. 
Smith, Weigert, and Thomas (1979) found general support for a positive correlation 
between religious behavior in adolescents and self-esteem. However, Smith, et ak did not 
examine the religious motivations and also found significant results in only a portion of 
the sample. Most studies reviewing direct relationships between self-esteem and religious 
motivation have shown few or no significant results when self-esteem was correlated 
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with intrinsic or extrinsic motivation (Watson, Hood, Morris, & Hall, 1985; Watson, 
Morris, & Hood, 1987; Watson, Milliron, Morris, & Hood, 1994). Also, when correlating 
quest motivation with self-esteem, Watson, et al. (1985, study 1), and Watson, Morris, & 
Hood (1987) found no significant relationship, although Leak et ak (1990, study 1) did 
find a significant relationship between quest motivation and self-esteem (as cited in 
Batson, 1993, p. 284). 
Religious Self-Discrepancies 
An Internet search located only one study on the relationship between self-
discrepancies and religion. Lilliston and Klein (1991) examined the extent to which self-
discrepancies affect the application of religious coping strategies to personal crisis. 
Participants completed the Selves Questionnaire. They responded to a series of religious 
activities that they might engage in to cope with personal crisis. The results indicated that 
only high actual/own:ought/own discrepancies were significantly related to religious 
coping strategies. Individuals with high actuakought discrepancies from the own point of 
view were more likely to engage in religious activities as a coping strategy for personal 
crisis than those with high actual/own:ideal/own discrepancies. The implication is that 
individuals who are more concerned with how significant others in their lives want them 
to be may be more likely to use the religion of those significant others as coping tools 
during personal crisis. 
The Current Study 
The current study combined self-discrepancy theory and self-monitoring to assess 
the degree to which discrepancies between actual religious self-states and ideal or ought 
religious self-guides mediate the level of self-esteem, depression, and anxiety in Christian 
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individuals. No research to date to assesses how discrepancies in religious selves affect 
self-esteem and depression. 
Based on previous findings, two specific hypotheses were posited. First, for low 
self-monitors, large discrepancies between actual religious self (motivations and beliefs) 
and ideal religious selves from the own perspective will be significantly related to greater 
depression and lower levels of self-esteem, but ought discrepancies from the other 
perspective should not lead to depression or reduced self-esteem. Second, for high self-
monitors large discrepancies between actual religious self and ideal or ought religious 
self from the other perspective will be significantly correlated with greater depression and 
lower levels of self-esteem, but discrepancies from ideal religious self from one's own 
perspective should not lead to depression or reduced self-esteem. 
Using Amos 4.0, data were analyzed for goodness-of-fit to the structural model 
presented in Figures 1 and 2. Goodness-of-fit to the model was calculated separately for 
high and low self-monitors and for own and other perspectives. For high self-monitors, 
the path from religious self-discrepancy to generalized negative affect was expected to be 
greater for other than for own perspective. For low self-monitors, the path from religious 
self-discrepancy to generalized negative affect was expected to be greater for own than 
for other perspective. 
This model assumed that the four measures of religious self-discrepancy from the 
own perspective would yield a generalized religious own-perspective self-discrepancy 
score. Similarly, it assumes that the four measures of religious self-discrepancy from the 
other perspective would yield a generalized religious other-perspective self-discrepancy 
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score. It also assumed that the three measures of negative affect (anxiety, depression, and 
low self-esteem) would yield a general negative affect score. 
15 
Figure 1 Hypothetical model of the effects of religious self-discrepancy (own perspective) 
upon negative affect. 
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Figure 2 Hypothetical model of the effects of religious self-discrepancy (other perspective) 
upon negative affect. 
ORTHODOX 
SELF-DIS 
(OTHER) L 
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Method 
Participants 
Participants (N=227) were recruited on a volunteer basis from undergraduate and 
graduate classes at a mid-sized state university. One individual did not complete the 
survey and was removed from the sample, leaving 156 females and 70 males. Eighty-
seven percent were Caucasian, 9% African-American, and 4% Hispanic, Asian, or other 
ethnicity. Eighty-seven percent of participants answered that they are Christians. 
Measures 
Self-Monitoring. Participants completed the revised version of the Self-
Monitoring Scale (Appendix A; Snyder & Gangestad, 1986) designed to place an 
individual into either a high or low self-monitoring group. Gonnerman et al. (2000) 
reported a reliability (Cronbach's alpha) coefficient of .70 for their sample of 294 college 
students. 
Self-Esteem. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (Appendix B; Rosenberg. 1965) is 
designed to assess a measure of global self-esteem based on a 1 Q-item, Likert-type 
format. Participants are asked to respond to various questions such as "On the whole, I 
am satisfied with myself," (reverse scored) or "At times I think I am no good at all," from 
strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). McFarland (2002) reported an alpha of .86 for 
more than 200 adults and .81 for 200 college students. 
Religious motivation. Six items per scale were taken from Allport & Ross's 
(1967) Religious Orientation Scales, assessing extrinsic orientation (Appendix C; Allport 
& Ross, 1967) and intrinsic orientation (Appendix D; Allport & Ross, 1967). The 
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participant responds to each statement by indicating to what degree the item applies to his 
or her life. The measure of quest orientation (Appendix E; Batson et al., 1993), also 
reduced to six items, was responded to in the same manner as the extrinsic and intrinsic 
measures. Batson et al. (1993) reported an alpha of .72 for the extrinsic measure, .83 for 
the intrinsic measure, and .78 for the quest measure on a group of 424 undergraduate 
students, using each of the full scales. 
Orthodoxy. The Doctrinal Orthodoxy Scale (Appendix F; Batson et al., 1993), 
also reduced to six items, was given to measure one's belief in traditional religious 
doctrines, primarily from the Christian perspective. Batson et al. reported an alpha of .91 
for a group of 424 undergraduate students, using the full scale. 
Religious Behavior. A four-item measure of the frequency of religious behavior 
(Appendix G) was added to assess how often each individual engages in the activities of 
reading the Bible, praying, attending church, and a general statement assessing the 
individual's degree of religiosity. 
Depression. The depression subscale of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL; 
Appendix H; Derogatis, Lipman, Rickels, Uhlenhuth, & Covi. 1974) is an eleven-item 
scale assessing an individual's recent experience of depression-related symptoms. 
Participants respond to each item in a Likert-type format from 1 (not at all) to 4 
{extremely). Derogotis et al. (1974) reported an alpha of .86 for three separate clinical 
samples. 
Anxiety. The anxiety subscale of the HSCL (Appendix 1: Derogatis et ak, 1974) is 
a seven-item scale assessing an individual's recent experience of anxiety-related 
symptoms. Participants respond to each item in a Likert-type format from 1 (not at all) to 
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4 (extremely). Derogatis et al. (1974) reported an alpha of .84 for three separate clinical 
samples. 
Procedure 
Participants completed a series of questionnaires consisting of the Self-
Monitoring Scale (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965), abbreviated (six-item) versions of the Intrinsic Scale of Religious 
Orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967), Extrinsic Scale of Religious Orientation (Allport & 
Ross, 1967), Quest Scale of Religious Life Inventory (Batson, et al., 1993), Doctrinal 
Orthodoxy scale (Batson, et al., 1993), and Religious Behavior Scale, as well as the 
depression and anxiety subscales of the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL; Derogatis, 
Lipman, Rickels, Uhlenhuth, & Covi, 1974). Abbreviation of the extrinsic, intrinsic, 
quest, and orthodoxy religious measures was done in the interest of shortening the time 
required of a participant to complete the questionnaire. Choices for items included in the 
abbreviated forms were based on face validity, selecting the six items from each scale 
that appear to best represent its content. Participants also answered four items assessing 
the frequency of religious behavior. 
The participants answered the Self-Monitoring Scale, Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
Scale, Doctrinal Orthodoxy Scale, and Depression and Anxiety Subscales once each. The 
participants answered the religious scales three times each: once as they actually see 
themselves, once as they would ideally like to be, and once as they believe significant 
others (parents, loved ones) would like them to be. The scales were answered in the order 
of the Self-Monitoring Scale, the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale, the four religious scales 
and religious behavior questions answered three times in the order of actual self, ideal 
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self, and other perspective, and lastly the depression and anxiety subscales. After 
returning the questionnaires, the participants received appropriate debriefing as to the 
purpose of their involvement. 
Results 
The sample was divided into high and low self-monitors based on criteria that 
scores of 10 or lower on the self-monitoring section of the survey denoted low self-
monitors (n = 135) and scores of 11 or higher denoted high self-monitors (n = 91). 
Analysis was then done for both high and low self-monitors for both actuakideal and 
actuakother discrepancies. The decision to place the cutoff score at 10 was based on the 
recommendation of Snyder and Gangestad's (1986) research that 10 is most often the 
best score to set as the cutoff limit. 
Self-discrepancy scores were calculated by summing the response values of each 
item in each of the five religious scales for the actual, ideal, and other perspectives. The 
absolute value of the difference between the actual (how one sees one's self) and ideal 
(how one aspires to be) perspectives produced the actuakideal discrepancy score on any 
given scale. Similarly, the absolute value of the difference between the actual and other 
(how one thinks others want him or her to be) perspectives produced the actuakother 
discrepancy score. Separate discrepancy scores were calculated for each of the five 
religious constructs assessed (extrinsic, intrinsic, and quest motivations, orthodoxy and 
religious behavior). Means, standard deviations, reliability coefficients, and correlations 
among variables in each of the four study groups are provided in Table 1. All scales used 
were found to be reliable, with alphas ranging from .71 to .88. 
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Table 1 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Reliability Coefficients for Each Study Group. 
M SD Rel. Alpha 
Self Est. 40 .15 6.59 .85 Self Est. - Self Esteem 
Self Mon. 8.70 3.60 .71 Self Mon. - Self Moni tor ing 
Ext. Act . 14.07 4.85 .77 Ext. - Extrinsic Motivat ion 
Int. Act . 18.95 5.79 .85 Int. - Intrinsic Motivat ion 
Qst. Act . 18.21 5.17 .79 Qst. - Quest Motivat ion 
Orth. Act 24 .48 5.96 .88 Orth. - Rel igious Or thodoxy 
Beh. Act. 12.95 4.03 .83 Beh. - Religious Behavior 
Ext. Id. 12.00 4.03 .79 Act. - Actual 
Int. Id. 23 .70 5.68 .86 Id. - Ideal (Own perspect ive) 
Qst. Id. 16.65 5.81 .83 Oth. - Other Perspect ive 
Orth. Id. 26 .20 5.23 .85 Dep. - Depression 
Beh. Id. 16.56 4.20 .88 Anx. - Anxiety 
Ext. Oth. 13.05 5.47 .83 
Int. Otn . 22 .98 5.80 .87 
Qst. Oth. 16.49 5.73 .85 
Orth. Oth 25 .92 5.07 .85 
Beh. Oth 15.71 4.34 .88 
Dep. 17.98 5.50 .84 
Anx. 9 .64 3.77 .88 
Intercorrelations were conducted between all discrepancy scores for all groups. As 
presented in Tables 2 and 3, discrepancy scores between the five religious measures 
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correlated highly with each other for both the actual:ideal discrepancy (Table 2) and 
actuakother discrepancy (Table 3). 
Table 2 
Actual:Ideal Discrepancies from the Own Perspective 
Extrinsic Intrinsic Quest Or thdxy Behaviors 
actuakideal actuakideal actuakideal actuakideal ac tuakideal 
Extrinsic 1.0 
actual: ideal 
Intrinsic actual .54** 1.0 
ideal 
Quest .27** .45** 1.0 
actual: ideal 
Or thdxy. .47** .60** .40** 1.0 
actual: ideal 
Behaviors .41 ** • 7 7 * * .40** .57** 1.0 
actual: ideal 
** - Correlat ion is s ignif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
Table 3 
Actual: Other Discrepancies from the Other Perspective 
Extrinsic Intrinsic Quest Orthdxy Behavior 
ac tuakother actuakother ac tuakother ac tuakother ac tuakother 
Extr insic 1.0 
actual :other 
Intrinsic 4 4 * * 1.0 
ac tuakother 
Quest .28** .34** 1.0 
ac tuakother 
Orthdxy 39** .30** 1.0 
actual :other 
Behavior .34** .68** 32** > j ** 1.0 
actual :other 
** - Correlat ion is s ignif icant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
In examining the correlations between discrepancy scores, it was discovered that 
although all of the correlations for the quest discrepancies were significantly related to 
the other four discrepancies, its coefficients were consistently lower than the correlation 
coefficients of the Religious Behavior scale with the other four discrepancies (see Tables 
2 and 3). It was therefore decided to substitute religious behavior in place of quest 
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motivation when analyzing the data's fit to the models presented in Figures 1 and 2. 
Thus, the self-discrepancies determined using the four measures of religion used in the 
revised model (extrinsic and intrinsic motivation, religious orthodoxy, and frequency of 
religious behaviors) loaded heavily onto the latent variable of a general religious self-
discrepancy. 
It was additionally found, as presented in Table 4 that the three measures of 
negative affect were significantly correlated with each other, indicating that a generalized 
negative affect exists as the path analysis model assumes. 
Table 4 
Measures of Negative Affect. 
Self-esteem Depression Anxiety 
Sel f -Esteem 1.0 
Depression - .41** 1.0 
Anxie ty - .23** .60** 1.0 
** - Correlat ion is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
However, when analyzing the data for fit to the models presented in Figures 1 and 
2, Amos 4.0 overcorrected for the anxiety and depression scales and reported an 
inadmissible solution due to negative variance for the depression scale, probably due to 
the high correlation between these two scales. After examining the data, it was decided 
to remove the anxiety scale from the model altogether. Rationale for this was taken from 
Higgins' (1987), who theorized that individuals with own perspective discrepancies are 
more likely to also suffer from depressive symptoms rather than anxious symptoms. 
25 
Low Self-Monitors 
As shown in Figure 3, for low self-monitors in the actuakideal analysis, the four 
measures of religious self-discrepancy used all contributed to the latent general religious 
self-discrepancy. Further, both depression and low self-esteem loaded highly on latent 
general negative affect as was expected. When the data were analyzed for fit to the 
revised model (with anxiety measure removed), the relationship between general 
religious self-discrepancy and general negative affect was found to be highly significant, 
p < .01. As presented in Figure 3, the data fit the presented model well. Three goodness-
of-fit indices were used. Data constitute a good fit to a model when chi-square is not 
significant, comparative goodness-of-fit (CFI) approaches 1.0, and root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA) approaches .00. 
For low self-monitors' actuakother discrepancies, the four measures of religious 
self-discrepancy again all contributed to the latent general religious self-discrepancy and 
depression and low self-esteem loaded highly on latent general negative affect. 
However, as presented in Figure 4, when the data were analyzed for fit to the revised 
model (with the anxiety measure removed), though it was found to be a good fit to the 
model presented, the relationship between general religious self-discrepancy and general 
negative affect was not significant. Therefore, a significant relationship was found 
between religious self-discrepancy and negative affect for low self-monitors for 
actuakideal discrepancies, but not for actuakother discrepancies, supporting the first 
hypothesis. 
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Figure 3 
Actual-Ideal Discrepancy and Negative Affect for Low Self Monitors 
Chi-square (6, N =135) = 6.30, p = .39, CFI = .996, RMSEA = .02 
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Figure 3 
Actual-Other Discrepancy and Negative Affect for Low Self Monitors 
Chi-square (6, N =135) = 6.30, p = .39, CFI = .996, RMSEA = .02 
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High Self-Monitors 
For high self-monitors in the actuakideal discrepancy analysis, the four measures 
of religious self-discrepancy all contributed to the latent general religious self-
discrepancy. When the data were analyzed for this group, an inadmissible solution due to 
negative variance was found again for the depression measure. The self-esteem and 
depression measures were again collapsed into one single measure of negative affect (the 
factor scores of depression and self-esteem). Goodness-of-fit indices indicated that the 
data were a perfect fit to the model presented in Figure 5 (CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = .000). 
However, the relationship between the negative affect and religious self-discrepancy 
variables was not significant. 
As shown in Figure 6, for high self-monitors in the actual:other discrepancy 
analysis, the four religious measures of religious self-discrepancy all again contributed to 
the latent general religious self-discrepancy. When the data were analyzed for this group, 
an inadmissible solution due to negative variance was found for the depression measure. 
By collapsing the self-esteem and depression measures into one single measure of 
negative affect (the factor scores of self-esteem and depression), the data were analyzed 
for fit to the revised model and was found to have a good fit to the model presented, 
though the relationship between general religious self-discrepancy and general negative 
affect was not found to be significant. Therefore, because there was no significant 
relationship found between religious self-discrepancies and negative affect for high self-
monitors for either the actuakideal or actuakother discrepancies, the second hypothesis 
was not supported. 
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Figure 3 
Actual-Ideal Discrepancy and Negative Affect for High Self Monitors 
Chi-square (6, N =135) = 6.30, p = .39, CFI = .996, RMSEA = .02 
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Figure 6 
Actual-Other Discrepancy and Negative Affect for High Self Monitors 
Chi-square (4, N =91)= 4.059, p = .398, CFI =.998, RMSEA = .03 
Discussion 
The purpose of the current study was to examine the effects of self-monitoring 
and religious self-discrepancies on levels of depression, anxiety, and self-esteem in 
Christian individuals. The hypotheses were that low self-monitors with large actuakideal 
religious discrepancies (own perspective) would have greater depression and lower self-
esteem than low self-monitors without that discrepancy, and secondly, that high self-
monitors with large actuakother religious discrepancies would have greater depression 
and lower self-esteem than high self-monitors without that discrepancy. 
Due to a better correlation between religious behavior and the remaining four 
measures of religious motivation than for quest motivation and the remaining four 
religious measures, the decision was made to substitute the religious behavior scale in 
place of the quest motivation scale when analyzing the data. Removal of the anxiety 
measure on the latent negative affect variable was necessary due to an inadmissible 
solution produced by the Amos program. 
It was found that all four groups analyzed produced acceptable levels of goodness 
of fit for their respective and revised models. A significant relationship was found 
between religious self-discrepancies and negative affect for low self-monitors for the 
actuakideal discrepancy. A similarly significant relationship was not found for low self-
monitors from the other perspective, thus supporting the hypothesis that low self-
monitors, who are more concerned with meeting their own expectations in religious 
beliefs, but who do not do so, are more likely to be depressed and have lower self-esteem 
than those who do not meet the expectations of others. These findings appear to be 
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consistent with Higgins' theory that individuals with self-discrepancies from their own 
ideals tend to be more prone to depressive symptoms. Also, these findings appear to be 
consistent with the findings of Gonnerman et al. (2000), in that low self-monitors tend to 
have more negative affect when they have actuakideal discrepancies rather than 
actuakother discrepancies. 
Significant relationships between religious self-discrepancies and negative affect 
for high self-monitors were not found for either the own:other or the own:ideal 
perspectives. This indicates that although high self-monitors in this sample may show 
signs of depression and low self-esteem and may have religious self-discrepancies, these 
two states are not related. Whatever causes negative affect in high self-monitors, it is not 
religious discrepancies either from one's own ideals or from the expectations of 
significant others. These findings are contrary to the results reported by Gonnerman et ak 
(2000), in that high self-monitors with self-discrepancies from the other perspective did 
have more instances of negative affect, whereas the current study did not find this to be 
the case. 
In finding a relationship between religious self-discrepancies and negative affect 
from the own perspective for low self-monitors, it is then reasonable to assume that this 
may be an area to address with the depressed, religious client who seeks treatment from a 
clinician. Due to the correlational nature of the data, we cannot assume that a religious 
self-discrepancy causes greater depression and lowered self-esteem. It is possible that an 
individual who is depressed would choose to abandon the religious beliefs that have been 
held up to that point. However, it seems illogical that someone would actually do this. 
Instead, it makes more sense that a person who has abandoned the religious beliefs might 
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feel some greater sense of depression or lower self-esteem. Regardless of the direction of 
causality, where there is a relationship between the two, the clinician has another area 
from which to approach treatment. 
There are perhaps several reasons as to why the second hypothesis was not 
confirmed. One reason may be the wording of the questions on the survey regarding the 
other perspective. Our survey asked the participants to report how they thought their 
parents and others close to them would want them to believe. We did not address the 
concept of anticipated peer approval in the general sense, only from the point of view of 
those closest to the participants. It may be that high self-monitors are more concerned 
with fulfilling the expectations of a larger peer group or of society in general than just the 
expectations of those closest to them. If that is the case, then the questionnaire would 
have failed to address this possibility. 
A second reason for the lack of confirmation of the second hypothesis may be the 
degree to which religion is important to the individuals in this sample. As this sample 
was taken at a public, state university where there are typically more diverse attitudes 
toward religion, these individuals may not have felt that their religious beliefs were of 
such importance to them that not living up to their own or others' expectations would 
lead to a propensity for depressive symptoms and lowrer self-esteem, or that having 
moved away from close proximity to those significant others, high self-monitors may feel 
less pressure to live up to those others' expectations. It is possible that taking a sample 
from a private, religiously affiliated institution or from church groups, where the level of 
devotion to and importance of religion to any given individual may be higher, might yield 
different results than those reported here. 
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A third possibility for the lack of relationship between high self-monitors' 
religious self-discrepancies and negative affect may be the relative age of the 
participants. Perhaps the older and more mature a person grows, the more important 
religious beliefs become. If this is the case then perhaps not having lived up to the 
expectations one has set in religious beliefs may become more salient and therefore more 
likely to result in depressive symptoms and lowered self-esteem. 
Fourth, it may simply be that there is no relationship for high self-monitors 
between their level of negative affect and the presence of a religious self-discrepancy. 
As implied earlier, one of the limitations of this study is the nature of the sample. 
A clinical sample may yield a different set of results and may give us a better 
understanding of what is needed of the clinician who is approached for treatment from a 
clinically depressed individual. Additionally, though Christianity is demographically the 
largest religious faith in Western culture, other faiths such as Judaism and Islam 
constitute large numbers of individuals, and the particular nature of the Orthodoxy Scale 
in specific, as well as the survey in general, did not account for individuals of other 
faiths. Future research as to the applicability of these hypotheses to individuals with 
other religious beliefs besides Christianity would be prudent. Development of an 
orthodoxy scale for these other faiths would be necessary for continuation in this line of 
research. 
As stated at the beginning of this study, there are countless individuals in the 
world who suffer from depression and low self-esteem. Until the last few years, many 
clinical psychologists have sought to minimize the effects of religion on a person's 
mental health, if not outrightly implicate religion as part of the cause of mental illness. 
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Much recent research has indicated that religion can indeed be beneficial to one's mental 
health, as well as detrimental. The findings presented in this study lend support to the 
notion that religion does indeed play a role in the mental health of individuals, and they 
provide clinicians with another point at which to probe the causes of depression in their 
religious clients. 
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Appendix A 
Self-Monitoring Scale 
T - True F - False 
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. 
2. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to do or say things that other 
will like. 
3. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. 
4. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about which I have almost no 
information. 
5. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain others. 
6. I would probably make a good actor. 
7. In a group of people I am rarely the center of attention. 
8. In different situations and with different people, I often act like very different 
persons. 
9. I am not particularly good at making other people like me. 
10. I'm not always the person I appear to be. 
11.1 would not change my opinions (or the way I do things) in order to please 
someone or win their favor. 
12.1 have considered being an entertainer. 
13.1 have never been good at games like charades or improvisational acting. 
14. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different 
situations. 
15. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories going. 
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16.1 feel a bit awkward in public and do not show up quite as well as I should. 
17. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a straight face (if for a right end). 
18.1 may deceive people by being friendly when I really dislike them. 
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Appendix B 
Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
1 - Strongly Agree 2 - Agree 3 - Disagree 4 - Strongly Disagree 
1.1 feel that I'm a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others. 
2.1 feel that I have a number of good qualities. 
3. All in all, I am inclined to feel that I am a failure. 
4 .1 am able to do things as well as most other people. 
5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of. 
6.1 take a positive attitude toward myself. 
7. On the whole, I am satisfied with myself. 
8.1 wish I could have more respect for myself. 
9. I certainly feel useless at times. 
10. At times I think I am no good at all. 
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Appendix C 
Extrinsic Scale of Religious Orientation 
1 - Strongly disagree 2 - Disagree 3 - Neutral 4 - Agree 5 - Strongly agree 
1. Although I believe in my religion, I feel there are many more important things in 
my life. 
2. It doesn't matter so much what I believe so longs as I lead a moral life. 
3. Although I am a religious person I refuse to let my religious considerations 
influence my everyday affairs. 
4. A primary reason for my interest in religion is that my church is a congenial 
social activity. 
5. Occasionally I find it necessary to compromise my religious beliefs in order to 
protect my social and economical well-being. 
6. One reason for my being a church member is that such membership helps to 
establish a person in the community. 
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Appendix D 
Intrinsic Scale of Religious Orientation 
1 - Strongly disagree 2 - Disagree 3 - Neutral 4 - Agree 5 - Strongly agree 
1. It is important for me to spend periods of time in private religious thoughts and 
meditation. 
2. If not prevented by unavoidable circumstances, I attend church. 
3. I try hard to carry my religion over into all my other dealings in life. 
4. I read literature about my faith (or church). 
5. If I were to join a church group I would prefer to join a Bible study group rather 
than a social fellowship. 
6. My religious beliefs are what really lie behind my whole approach to life. 
45 
Appendix E 
Quest Scale of the Religious Life Inventory 
1 - Strongly disagree 2 - Disagree 3 - Neutral 4 - Agree 5 - Strongly agree 
1. As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change. 
2. I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs. 
3. It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties. 
4. For me, doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious. 
5. My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions. 
6. There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing. 
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Appendix F 
Doctrinal Orthodoxy Scale 
1 - Strongly disagree 2 - Disagree 3 - Neutral 4 - Agree 5 - Strongly agree 
1. I believe God created the universe. 
2. I believe Jesus Christ is the Divine Son of God. 
3. I believe one must accept Jesus Christ as Lord and Savior to be saved from sin. 
4. I believe in life after death. 
5. I believe there is a transcendent realm (an "other'" world, not just this world in 
which we live). 
6. I believe the Bible is the unique authority for God's will. 
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Appendix G 
Frequency of Religious Behavior 
34.1 am a religious person. 
a. Strongly disagree 
b. Disagree 
c. Neutral 
d. Agree 
e. Strongly Agree 
35.1 attend church 
a. Never 
b. 2-3 times a year 
c. 1 time a month 
d. 3-4 times a month 
e. whenever the doors are open 
36.1 read the Bible 
a. Never 
b. 2-3 times a year 
c. 2-3 times a month 
d. 2-3 times a week 
e. daily 
37.1 pray 
a. Never 
b. 2-3 times a year 
2-3 times a month 
2-3 times a week 
daily 
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Appendix H 
Anxiety Subscale, HSCL 
"How have you felt during the past seven days including today?" 
1 - Not at all 2 - Some 3 -- A lot 4 - Extreme 
1. Nervousness or shakiness inside 
2. Trembling 
3. Suddenly scared for no reason 
4. Feeling fearful 
5. Heart pounding or racing 
6. Having to avoid certain places or activities because they frighten you 
7. Feeling tense or keyed up 
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Appendix I 
Depression Subscale, HSCL 
"How have you felt during the past seven days including today?" 
1 - Not at all 2 - Some 3 - A lot 4 - Extreme 
1. Loss of sexual interest or pleasure 
2. Thoughts of ending your life 
3. Poor appetite 
4. Crying easily 
5. A feeling of being trapped or caught 
6. Blaming yourself for things 
7. Feeling lonely 
8. Feeling blue 
9. Worrying or stewing about things 
10. Feeling no interest in things 
11. Feeling hopeless about the future 
